Look at the jam in Congress. One side proposes a budget the other can’t countenance; the second blocks all progress. The parties remind us of two overly wide men trying to pass through the same door but wedged shoulder-to-shoulder. Neither will yield, so neither can move.

We at Fiction Writers for Better Misinformation have two proposals that will end the obstruction caused by our misshapen political parties.

Governing Solution #23

Why is compromise so difficult on budget votes? Yes, a relatively small difference in federal spending can make a huge difference in the life of the nation, and so differences of opinion are consequential here, but now it seems that, if one party is proposing to spend $27,155,072,010 on the Department of Energy, while the other proposes $27,155,072,024, they still can’t reach an agreement—as if any compromise is a capitulation. And yet, within each party, there must be individual legislators willing to move up or down from their leadership’s initial position. It’s the enforcement of party discipline, along with the diffusion of responsibility that comes from voting in blocs, that keeps the two sides lined up along their fronts, each man or woman unwilling to set a foot forward alone.

How do we change this? We mandate that all budget votes in the future run as a sort of Dutch auction in reverse. For each department, the funding starts at $0 and is moved up in increments of, say, $1 billion, in a series of turns. All voting members are gathered in a room at the start. As each turn begins, any legislator who believes that is the maximum amount of funding they are willing to vote for leaves the room. So, if you think $0 is the right amount for the Department of Energy, say, you leave the room at turn one. If you think $1 billion is right, you leave at turn two, and so on. When a majority of legislators have left the room, the turns stop, and the budget is set at the last number reached in the count-up.

To increase personal accountability (we all favor that, right?), when leaving the room, each legislator must stop, face a camera, and announce, “I am Representative So and So, and I support funding the Department of Energy at $27,900,000,000 (or zero or whatever) for fiscal year 2013.” That way they’re inescapably on record, as individuals and their records and preferences can be compared with others’ more clearly.

Let’s think about how this will change budget votes. There are two main variations. In the first, the majority party wants lower spending. Let’s assume that the amount proposed by leadership is somewhere near the mean preference of the party as a whole–low enough to keep extremists happy, high enough to reassure moderates or those with competitive districts. In the new system, with each legislator voting his or her conscience (or whatever proxy mental facility members of Congress use for the purpose), the final result is likely to be higher than the leadership proposal, as it has to capture 90% or more of the party. Similarly, when the majority party wants a higher budget, they don’t begin to vote until the minority has spoken, and the lowest 10% or so of the majority will provide the crucial breaking point. In both cases, we get a result somewhere between the two leadership proposals.

Some other features of this system: It creates a strong incentive for individual legislators to negotiate with each other, since one vote can prove decisive. This will happen both within and across party lines, increasing communication and understanding—as opposed to brinksmanship. It increases the amount of information available about each legislator’s preferences. The point is that the power is taken out of the hands of leadership. When you think about it, legislative leaders exercise power largely through control of the process, which means they have the greatest potential power before a vote takes place. Indeed, the vote marks the end of their power. So, they always have an incentive to maneuver and delay. We can change that.

Governing Solution #24

This one’s simple: Dictate that x number of votes must occur each year; each legislator is given one-half x yes votes and one-half x no votes to cast each year. Each party will then of course scheme—err, strategize to create favorable votes for themselves and unfavorable ones for the opposition. But the key feature here is that neither party can dominate or obstruct, having a limited number of yes votes and a limited number of no votes. Congress will hold votes and get business done, with no opportunity for gross unfairness.

We know that the current leadership of Congress will irrevocably and energetically oppose these ideas, if for no other reason than to maintain their hold on the levers of power. And yet these ideas would undoubtedly benefit the country. Let us pass over the considerations of what this says about the characters of our leaders and ask, is there a reason to voice such impractical, even fanciful, ideas?

Yes. It is one of the beauties of imaginative literature that it can conceive what is currently inconceivable and lay the foundations to make the preposterous one day possible.

Join us at FBMisin in trying to imagine a better future.

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Read another FBMisin proposal to make government better.